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Back to the Besieged Fortress?
Russia under Putin is a country that does not dream. Society has no 
great ambitions and keeps its expectations low. Elites cling to short-term, 
mercantilist and self-seeking ruling methods. Political and economic leaders 
have their eyes fixed on the March 2008 presidential succession and the 
consolidation of their vested interests beyond that crucial date.
In such a context, Russia’s relations to the outside world cannot be 
open, trustful or productive. With no vision for the development of the 
country, how could there be a vision for Russia in the world? The slogans of 
“sovereign democracy” and “Russia for the Russians” do not bode well for 
the cultural influence and power projection of Russia abroad. This chapter 
aims at demonstrating the limits of Russia’s new assertiveness in foreign 
affairs, with a special focus on relations with its Western “periphery” and 
Europe, but also underlines the potential dangers of Moscow’s corrosive 
methods for our own capacity, in Europe, to deal with the complex post-
Soviet legacy. The Russian leadership is not accountable to anyone or any 
institution. It is more prone to dictate the rules of the game, thereby un-
dermining our institutional mechanisms and usages of consensus-seeking 
and multilateralism. 
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From better to worse: Russia and the West since 1999 
Russia has long been in a Hegelian relationship with Europe and with 
the West. Modernisation in tsarist Russia was devised with a constant eye 
on European models and a desire to open windows to the more developed 
countries of Europe. The Soviet doctrine was one of hate and denial of the 
Enemy, non-dissociable from fascination and attraction to Western accom-
plishments and power. Gorbachev’s reforms stemmed from a strong will to 
come closer to European standards and build a “common European Home”. 
The West, or rather Western Europe, is the preferred Other; however, as 
opinion polls showed already in the 1990s, although Europe is perceived 
with more sympathy than animosity, Russians do not see themselves as 
belonging to it.
The paradigm that helps best understand Moscow’s attitude today is 
the proclaimed “specificity” and defence against foreign influence. The 
two are closely linked. Surkov’s “sovereign democracy” has been selling 
since 2005 as the recipe for reasserting Russia that would be free of any 
form of conditionality or dependence on Western partners1. His concept 
was defined a posteriori, after Vladimir Putin had tilted toward a harsher 
foreign policy, which had undoubtedly been made possible by the rising 
oil prices and the recovery of Russia’s financial situation in 2002–2003. At 
the Valdai conference2 in September 2005, asked why he chose this com-
bination of words and whether this was a concept for domestic politics or 
for foreign policy, Putin gave a complicated response that boiled down to 
the following: the concept applies to both spheres, meaning democracy 
1 Vladislav Surkov is Vladimir Putin’s Deputy Chief of Staff at the presidential administration 
and his “ideology“ man. See for instance his “secret speech“ of May 2006, presented by Mikhail 
Sokolov on Radio Liberty on 11 July, 2006, and his 2007 booklet  Osnovnye tendentsii i perspektivy 
razvitiya sovremennoi Rossii (Main Trends and prospects for development in contemporary Russia), 
www.polit.ru/2007/01/23/surkov_print.htlm.
2 The Valdai Discussion group meets once a year in Russia. The first conference gathered in Sep-
tember 2004 in Novgorod and Moscow. The group is composed of about 35 Western specialists of 
Russia, and, on the Russian side, members of the government, advisers to the President, deputies, 
experts, and journalists. An encounter with the President of Russia is the closing event. 
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at home, but à la russe, and equalling to asserted sovereignty in relations 
with foreign countries. One cannot go without the other. Russian specific 
“democracy” cannot consolidate if it is polluted from the outside, Russian 
power cannot rise if it lets influence inside, without any protection. At the 
next Valdai conference in September 2006, Vladimir Putin was asked the 
same question. Taking into consideration the fact that his guests were 
Western specialists of Russia, he answered with caution. He insisted that 
each term be taken separately, democracy pertaining to internal choices, 
and sovereignty concerning Russia’s national interest and independent 
position in world affairs3.
Specificity means “no interference”. The more one speaks of the Russian 
“path” and sovereign democracy, the more one wishes to confront Eastern 
and Western partners and distance oneself from their “values”. Hostility, 
distrust and, at times, aggressive positioning against neighbors and against 
the USA are closely correlated to a protectionist trend: protection against 
influence, against migrants, against values and against foreign investment 
in strategic sectors like energy. This combination of brutal assertiveness and 
self-protection is not paradoxical, but a clear sign of what Putin’s foreign 
policy is not. It is not an ambitious policy of re-conquest, nor a strategy 
of economic “imperialism” by energy domination. As Arkadi Moshes also 
emphasises in his contribution, the Kremlin is not “neo-imperialist”, since 
it does not want to continue to subsidise the former Soviet republics with 
cheap oil and gas. If it were seeking to re-conquer those countries, it would 
increase their economic dependence.
The rejection of influence is the red thread that runs along the chronol-
ogy of Russian relations with Western countries since 1990s4. In the second 
half of 1980s and early 1990s, the momentum was strong, led by change at 
home and intensified cooperation with the West, on the basis of condition-
3 Notes of the author, meeting with Vladimir Putin, Novo Ogarevo, 9 September 2006. 
4 Marie Mendras, “Russia and the West: to Belong or not to Belong?”, in Jan Zielonka and Alex 
Pravda, eds., Democratic Consolidation in Eastern Europe, Vol. 2, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 
2001, pp. 485–510.
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ality: democratization and rapprochement, with Western support. Russia 
joined many European and international organisations, except NATO and 
the European Union, with which it signed partnership agreements, and with 
the exception of the World Trade Organisation, which it will join before 
the end of this decade. Many Russian politicians, experts and intellectuals 
criticised the “unilateral concessions” that their weakened country had to 
make to the more powerful Western partners. But their complaints were 
not taken very seriously, either by the Yeltsin leadership or by the foreign 
“protectors”5.
Three major turning points in Russia’s policies occurred in 1999–2000, 
2003–2004 and 2006–2007 (at the time of writing). In the aftermath of the 
dramatic financial crash of August 1998 and in the midst of Yeltsin’s gloomy 
fin de règne, succession was the key issue amongst ruling elites. And succes-
sion did not mean only the replacement of ailing Boris Yeltsin, but also the 
protection of newly conquered assets and fortunes, and the consolidation 
of powerful networks. The pattern was set for future electoral cycles. Four 
years later, and eight years later, the stakes behind the presidential choice 
became formidable. 
1999 was not only the year of Yeltsin’s succession: it also was the year of 
NATO strikes against Serbia in the Kosovo war, and of the decision to wage 
a second war in Chechnya. The three events were closely interconnected. 
The NATO strikes in the spring were used by the military and the intelligence 
services as a good argument to go ahead with a second massive and dev-
astating campaign in Chechnya in the autumn. Anti-Americanism reached 
a peak in official rhetoric and in public opinion. It receded slowly afterwards, 
but remained relatively high even after the September 2001 World Trade 
Center tragedy and the Russian support for “war against terrorism”6. Russia 
5 See the different views and analyses in Vladimir Baranovsky, ed., Russia and Europe. The Emerg-
ing Security Agenda, SIPRI, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1997, p. 582.
6 Youri Levada, Marie Mendras, “L’alliance opportuniste de Vladimir Poutine et George W. Bush”, 
Esprit, August–September 2002, pp. 32–48.
141
and the Western partners closed ranks again in 2001 with the war against 
the Taliban, but relations could never regain their earlier quality7.
In 2003, on the eve of the legislative and presidential elections, Russia 
became engaged in the last struggle of pluralism and opposition against the 
one-dimensional reality of Putin’s rule. Mikhail Khodorkovsky, Yukos owner 
and manager, was arrested in October 2003, jailed and later sentenced to 
eight years of imprisonment; he will be sentenced to several more years 
after a second unfair trial to be held in 2007. At the same time, Russia 
faced the enlargement of the European Union by ten new Member States, 
of which three were former Soviet republics – the Baltic states – and four 
were former satellites of the USSR. Terrorist attacks made Russians feel more 
and more insecure. After the Beslan hostage-taking in a North-Ossetian 
school in September 2004, Putin’s position hardened on the domestic and 
the foreign fronts.
The present time, 2006–2007, is another crucial period. We are observing 
a new decisive step towards what Lilia Shevtsova names “Imitation Russia”8, 
Michael Specter qualifies as “Kremlin, Inc.”9, Arkadi Moshes gently defines 
as „post-imperialism”10, U.S. Defence Secretary Robert Gates as “a new cold 
war”, and what I refer to as Russia’s self-inflicted isolation. 
Once again, the rise of tensions in Russia’s foreign policy occurs during 
a pre-electoral year in the context of growing tensions and uncertainty about 
who will be the next President, i.e. the new power-broker in a system of 
consolidated political, financial and industrial networks headed by powerful 
government officials, FSB officers and cronies, and oligarchs. 
By the end of his eight-year presidency, Vladimir Putin will have suc-
ceeded in spoiling Russia’s relations with every single one of its long-time 
7 Vladimir Frolov, “A Complex Relationship, Russia Profile, vol. 4, N. 1, January 2007, p. 47.
8 Lilia Shevtsova, “Imitation Russia”, Carnegie Centre, Moscow, 2006.
9 Michael Specter, “Kremlin, Inc.”, The New Yorker, 29 January 2007, available on www.newyorker.
com/printables/fact/070129.
10 See his contribution to this volume, and his article “Prospects for EU-Russia Foreign and 
Security Policy Cooperation”, The EU-Russia Review, N. 2, EU-Russia Centre, Brussels, November 
2006, pp. 22–26.
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partners: the United States, the European Union countries, both the “old” 
and the “new” (the former satellites of Central and Eastern Europe), and 
most former Soviet republics. As will be argued below, even relations with 
its “younger brother”, Belarus, have seriously deteriorated in recent years, 
with a peak at Christmas 2006 over natural gas.
Europe remains the preferred other, but relations and mutual  
perceptions have deteriorated
The Russian Federation and the European Union are two asymmetrical 
partners. Russia is a vast country, ruled by an undemocratic leadership, with 
a population that only 16 years ago was a Soviet population, i.e. had been 
raised in a particular relationship to Europe and the West. The national 
economy is growing, but not harmoniously11. Relations with the former 
republics are complex, and not productive. 
The European Union is a multilateral community of 27 states, with 
a complex institutional framework, an integrated economy, and a common 
European law. Each state nevertheless maintains its own attitudes and poli-
cies on many issues, one of them being Russia. Nine of EU Member States 
had lived under Soviet domination for more than four decades and have their 
legitimate concerns about Russia’s uncertain future. Hence, the relationship 
between Russia and the UE may not likely resemble a traditional state-to-
state relation. On the one hand, Moscow feels stronger because Europe is 
heavily dependent on Russian hydrocarbons, and because Kremlin does not 
have to care about consensus at home whereas the EU is constantly strug-
gling to reach compromises in Brussels. On the other hand, Europe is Russia’s 
major economic partner and the most stable and reliable neighbor. Europe 
remains the only main door to the West, i.e., to the industrialised nations. 
It would seem very unreasonable for Moscow to bring this relationship to 
a deadlock. But emotions and big phrases have been taking their toll.
11 See “Russian Federation. 2006”, OECD Economic Surveys, OECD Publishing, Volume 2006/17, 
November 2006, p. 216.
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Clearly, official declarations and media coverage about a less friendly 
Europe have had their impact on Russian perceptions. In a survey done in 
December 2006 by the Levada Centre for the EU-Russia Centre in Brussels, 
Russians were asked whether the European Union constitutes a potential 
threat to their country. 45% of respondents agreed, 37% disagreed, and 
17% gave no answer. As sociologists comment on the results of their survey, 
“Russian attitudes towards Europe have changed markedly since the end 
of 1990s. In reviewing past research in 2000 by the Levada Centre, 35% of 
Russians believed that Western democracy and culture were destructive for 
Russia. This had shifted to 42% by the end of 2006”. Table 1 shows more 
details the Russian public’s attitudes.
Table 1. How is Russia seen by European countries? How are European 
countries perceived in Russia? (Respondents could select more than one 
response)
Russia is most likely to be seen 
by European countries as...
(%)
European countries are most 
likely to be seen by Russians 
as...
(%)
A source of raw materials 40 Neighbors and partners with 
whom to strengthen and de-
velop relations 
32
A source of technical expertise 
for Western companies and sci-
entific institutions
25 Having a high standard of 
living
29
A place for profitable invest-
ments
24 Main trading partners 24
A country where there is no law 
for those who have money
20 Attractive countries for Rus-
sians to work in or emigrate 
to
23
An undeveloped, unpredictable 
and aggressive country
17 Centers of cultural and histori-
cal values
10
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A neighbor and partner with 
whom to strengthen and develop 
relations
15 Potential aggressors united by 
the NATO military bloc
8
The home country of people who 
“throw money about”
14 Implementers of US policy on 
the Eurasian continent
7
A potential military adversary 12 No answer 16
A country from which unwanted 
migrants come to Europe 
9
A great power, with a rich cul-
tural heritage 
8
A country controlled by the KGB 4
No answer 12
Russians see European perceptions of themselves quite negatively. Their 
perception of Europe is more positive, but the overall picture indicates the 
existence of a wide gap between the two worlds. The growing animosity 
towards Georgians, Ukrainians and other former Soviet nationalities must 
be understood in consideration of this dim view of relations with Europe.
The tactics of “weak sovereignty” 
The image of the Enemy is unveiled in the next tables, which demon-
strate the great distrust against former compatriots. This phenomenon is 
the natural continuation of the relentless demonising of the Chechens since 
1999, with fierce one-sided television coverage. Terrorism was the first fuel 
used to brew xenophobic attitudes; “colored revolutions” in Georgia and 
Ukraine were the second.
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Table 2. Name five countries which in your opinion are close friends and 
allies of Russia 
2005 May 2006 May
Belarus 46 47
Germany 23 22
Kazakhstan 20 33
Ukraine 17 10
India 16 15
Table 3. Name five countries which on your opinion have unfriendly and 
hostile attitude towards Russia
2005 May 2006 May
Latvia 49 46
Lithuania 42 42
Georgia 38 44
Estonia 32 28
USA 23 37
Putin has managed to make most of the former Soviet republics “en-
emies” in the Russian mind. The Levada Centre opinion polls give a strikingly 
distrustful perception of neighboring countries. The three Baltic states and 
Georgia are amongst the first five countries that are unfriendly or hostile 
to Russia, together with the USA. Amongst the five friendliest to Russia, 
Belarus comes first with 47%, followed by Kazakhstan (33%), Germany 
(22%), and India (15%). Ukraine comes 5th with only 10% of respondents 
who believe that Ukraine is a close fiend and ally of Russia. With the excep-
tion of Belarus, Russians do not see any of the former republics as a close 
friend. And Belarus is an exception in yet another manner. Asked in a later 
poll whether Belarus is foreign or not (Schitaete li vy Belarus zagranitsei?), 
61% of respondents reply that Belarus is not a foreign country12.
12 Levada Centre opinion poll, 30 January 2007, http://levada.ru/press/2007013004.
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Interestingly, a majority of Russians believe that relations with Belarus 
have deteriorated in recent years and only a minority sees the relationship 
as “friendly” (8%), or “good-neighborly” (16%), or “warm enough” (10%).
The Russian-named “near abroad” is where domestic affairs and foreign 
policy become blurred. If the non-loyal Ukraine or Georgia behaves badly, 
then it should be punished. Russia will raise the price of gas, embargo 
imports and interfere in Ukrainian and Georgian affairs. And it will do its 
utmost to impede any resolution of the “frozen conflicts” in Georgia and 
Moldova (South Ossetia, Abkhazia and Transnistria). The goal is to keep 
each of these countries’ sovereignty weak, so that none of them can act 
independently in regional and international politics and economics. 
The Russian public is being talked into putting all the blame on the 
neighbors and evading responsibility. What regular opinion polls have 
been showing since 2004 is that hostility towards Ukraine and Goergia has 
changed into animosity against the people themselves. Worked up by their 
media, Russians developed after the Orange Revolution an anti-Ukrainian, 
and not only an anti-Yushchenko, attitude. To most sociologists’ dismay, 
they also supported the anti-Georgian campaign of the autumn of 2006. 
Perceptions of the Balts do not fare any better. In Russia today, “national 
identity” is being artificially and negatively constructed on the basis of 
distorted images of the enemy. 
As Salomé Zourabichvili recalls, Russia’s policy has not always been 
negative, which proves that there is no fatalism and that alternative policies 
exist. For instance, Foreign Minister Lavrov signed an agreement with her in 
August 2004, when she was his Georgian counterpart, about the withdrawal 
of Russian troops. The same can be said of Moscow’s counterproductive 
policy toward Lukashenko’s Belarus. Relations have been difficult all along, 
but they became much tenser in 2002–2003 and are at a deadlock in 2007. 
And when Vladimir Putin brags about his alliance with Central Asian states, 
he conceals the numerous tensions that poison Russia’s relations with Kaza-
khstan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan, to name the biggest states. 
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In fact, Kremlin feels threatened by any form of democratisation in countries 
of the former USSR – countries that might still be stopped on their way to West-
ernisation, i.e. NATO and EU membership. Domestic change is seen by Moscow 
as the main danger jeopardising the status quo. It is therefore vital to convince 
ordinary Russians that responsibility for the worsening of relations lay with the 
Ukrainians, and the Georgians, and all the others. If the “others” are bad, then 
Russians are right… The lack of accountability in Russian governance means 
the lack of responsibility for rulers and ruled alike. This is the most serious bias. 
The problem with the Russian ruling elites is that they are not accountable to 
anyone, either in domestic government, or in foreign affairs.
The image of the Enemy cannot agree with democratic trends. Polls 
show a strict correlation between attitudes to Europe and the West and 
attitudes to democracy. The EU-Russia Centre survey, monitored by the 
Levada Centre, offers an interesting, and very ambivalent, picture of how 
Russians view democracy. “Russian understanding of democracy, liberal-
ism, freedom and human right is confused and often contradictory, and 
Russians appear to see little application of these values to their own lives. 
Some 65% of the sample were unable to describe what liberal democracy 
means to them”. Almost half the respondents, however, say that “Western 
democracy and Western culture can be benefited from a lot”. But the 2000-
2006 comparison shows that the Western model is losing ground in the 
mind of ordinary Russians.
Table 4. Do you believe that Western democracy and Western culture…
2000 April 2006 December
Are necessary, will have a recovery effect 
for Russia 
2 3
Can be benefited from a lot 55 45
Are not suitable for us 25 30
Are destructive, pernicious for Russia 10 12
No opinion 8 10
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Those findings echo survey data on Russians’ “mirovozrenie”, or “world-
view”, and distrust of most foreign countries. Such distrust is daily conveyed 
by government-controlled media and officials’ speeches. Vladimir Putin’s 
address to an international security conference in Munich on 10 February 
2007 exemplifies the hostile and sharply worded discourse that the Presi-
dent himself now chooses to adopt when facing foreign heads of state and 
government. His Munich attack was mostly anti-American, but also strongly 
critical of NATO and the OSCE. Putin assailed Washington’s “unilateral” and 
“militaristic” approach that made the world a more dangerous place than at 
any time during the Cold War. “The United States has outstepped its national 
borders in every way. Nobody feels secure anymore, because nobody can 
take safety behind the stone wall of international law”13.
He appealed to the European countries to counter this “unilateralism”, 
but warned that new emerging powers – Brazil, India, Russia, and China 
– would take the lead. The tone was markedly cooler than in his diplomatic 
article of November 2006, published in several main European newspapers, 
where he tried to calm down European concerns. “Those who warn of 
the danger of Europe becoming more dependent on Russia see Russia-EU 
relations in black and white and try to fit them into the obsolete mould 
of ‘friend or foe’. (…) The past must not be used to divide us, because we 
cannot rewrite history”. His appeal appeared on the eve of the Russia-EU 
summit that failed to renew the Partnership14.
The dichotomic view of the outside world means that Russia has no 
friends. How can it hope to regain influence? Russia has no cultural, ideo-
logical or political appeal beyond its borders. What country in the world 
today would take Russia for model? Can energy be a sufficiently effective 
tool for imposing one’s views and one’s decision over organized states and 
a community of states? 
13 Full transcript on www.kremlin.ru/text/appears/2007/02/11/118109.
14 Vladimir Putin, “Europe has nothing to fear from Russia’s aspirations”, Financial Times, 
22 November, 2006, p. 13.
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Here lies the true and deep contradiction of the Kremlin’s strategy: dis-
tance and isolation, together with energy deterrence and confrontational 
policies, are unlikely to bring power, influence and radiance to Russia 
abroad. The weakest point here is the lack of vision for the future, a vision 
that would combine a project for Russia itself as a nation and as a state, 
and a project for Russia on the continent and in the world.
A partner that resists partnership
Russia has no allies. Russia wants no allies. We did not isolate Russia 
against its own will. Putin’s leadership, supported by the diplomatic, military 
and intelligence elites, made the conscious choice of preferring an outsider’s 
position to an insider’s hand in a multilateral game. Russia wants to impose 
its own rules, hence defy our European usages, in the realms where it feels 
stronger: energy, security, control of the media and public opinion. It is not 
prone to placing trust at the heart of foreign relations. Rapport de forces 
and carrot-and-stick continue to be the natural method for many Russian 
government officials. It also tends to use one partner against another. It 
has recently put much emphasis on its warmer relations with India and 
China, presenting Asia as an alternative to Europe, in case Europe becomes 
too demanding. Asian powers will play a very significant role in Moscow’s 
policies in the future, but they cannot in any way constitute a replacement 
to the partnership with the EU and with NATO. Furthermore, perceptions 
of China in the Russian public as much as among the elites remain very 
suspicious15.
Vladimir Frolov, director of the National Laboratory for Foreign Policy in 
Moscow insists that one of Russia’s main impediments to more productive 
relations with the West and Europe is that it has never been a true supporter 
of multilateralism. The big exception was 1990–1995 (Kuwait, Yugoslavia), 
he argues. Frolov is sceptical about EU–Russia relations: For now, Russia’s 
15 Vladimir Shlapentokh, “China in the Russian Mind Today: Ambivalence and Defeatism”, Eu-
rope-Asia Studies, Vol. 59, N. 1, January 2007, pp. 1–21.
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relations with Europe in general continue to be best characterized as main-
tenance of the status quo, although they are occasionally irritated by small 
but important issues, such as energy security and unpredictable US foreign 
policy initiatives16. Fyodor Lukyanov, Editor of Russia in Global Affairs, be-
lieves the true problem in Russia’s attitudes is psychological17.
Russia’s behaviour is not framed in a well-defined blueprint with long-
term goals. It is a day-to-day adjustment to new constraints and new oppor-
tunities, with the natural propensity to secure immediate gains and give little 
attention to the delayed consequences of today’s decisions. It is often said 
that Russians are good chess players. Western governments tend to believe 
in this axiom, thereby expecting Moscow to always have ulterior motives 
and prepare their next ten moves. I do not see any sign of long-sightedness 
of the Putin leadership in its management of foreign relations. We tend to 
read Russia’s intentions through our own rational lens. But a non-demo-
cratic government that is not accountable doest not have the rationality of 
a democratic government. It does not need to abide by its words. Above 
all, it does not need to care about securing the population’s well-being in 
20 or 30 years. The new catchword of “Russia for the Russians” clearly closes 
the horizon beyond the very immediate present. What other big country 
would seriously herald such a protectionist and self-serving policy? Is not 
the Kremlin trapped in its own game of antagonizing partners? For Russia 
is an open country and will never again be a closed fortress. Soviet days 
and Cold War politics are over.
The challenge that Western countries are facing is how to deal with an 
ideocratic, closed-up, unaccountable and rent-seeking leadership. May we 
be forced to play by Moscow’s rules as Moscow will not change its position 
in the near future, and we cannot disengage from Russia? Can we remain 
impervious to Russian methods? The key lies in a clear and cold-headed 
understanding of how and why Russia acts the way it does, and what we 
can expect from it. Moscow’s emotional and artificially worked up attitudes 
16 Vladimir Frolov, „A Complex Relationship”, Russia Profile, vol. 4, N. 1, January 2007, p. 47.
17 Izvestiia, 28 April 2006.
need not be met by equally emotional attitudes, either excusing Russia (“this 
old empire has been traumatized and should not be hurt in its feelings”), 
or refusing to go ahead with a difficult dialogue (“better disengage than 
lose one’s values”). More importantly, one should consider that Russia’s 
current politics are not fixed forever, and that alternatives policies to today’s 
authoritarianism and self-inflicted isolation potentially exist. It is also up to 
the Europeans to keep options open, and work in their favour.
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